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The Circumstances of Friendship: A Reply
to Francis Mootz, Eileen Scallen, Paul Kahn
and Richard Sherwin
Eugene Garver*
I am very grateful to my four comrades for taking my book so
seriously. In these responses, I have no interest in showing where they
misread me in order to prove that I was right after all. Instead I want to
highlight six places that I now take as topics for further inquiry. I take
their comments as acts of friendship, and want to respond in kind by
using their remarks as the basis for further joint inquiry.
I. At first I was surprised that Kahn'-and Mootz2 -found me
addressing the autonomy of law. I didn't think that's what the book was
about. The word "integrity" appears exactly once in For the Sake of
Argument.3 But, I realized, my subject throughout was the autonomy of
practical reason, and legal reasoning was frequently the source of my
examples of practical reasoning, so their reading me as concerned with
the autonomy of law is, although surprising, fair. This is a case of
readers understanding an author's intention better than the author
himself; a nice example of the effects of friendship. Kahn rightly
situates questions of the autonomy of law in a larger context of the
rational character of law. Not all reasoning is rationalization or the use
of reason as an instrument to achieve goals that themselves have nothing
to do with reason: but how do you tell the difference between reasoning
and rationalizing?
* Eugene Garver is Regents Professor of Philosophy at Saint John's University
with his A.B. and Ph. D. from the University of Chicago. In addition to For the Sake of
Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of Belief Professor Garver is
author of MACHIAVELLI AND THE HISTORY OF PRUDENCE (1987), ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC:
AN ART OF CHARACTER (1994), and CONFRONTING ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS (2006).
1. Paul W. Kahn, Judicial Ethos and the Autonomy of Law, 110 PENN ST. L. REV.
933 (2006).
2. Francis J. Mootz III, Argument, Political Friendship and Rhetorical Knowledge:
A Review of Garver's For the Sake of Argument, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 905 (2006).
3. EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT: PRACTICAL REASONING,
CHARACTER, AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 1 (2004).
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Since they told me that For the Sake of Argument concerns the
autonomy of law, I have wondered what is special about legal reasoning
as opposed to practical reasoning in general. I'm not concerned with the
difference between law and politics, or legal institutions vs. political
institutions. Instead, I want to know what is special about the legal 6thos
and the 6thos of people, not only judges and advocates, engaged in legal
reasoning. If there is a difference between reasoning and rationalizing,
we won't find it by a neutral demarcation criterion, but by seeing them as
ethically distinct.
Like practical reason in general, as Kahn says, "legal argument
takes place in a situation that simultaneously offers too little and too
much. ' 4  Aristotle says in the Rhetoric that rhetorical arguments
shouldn't be too long.5 That looks like purely tactical advice, but points
to something about the autonomy of practical reason. Decisions and
judgments are always in danger of being too remote from the evidence
because we know both too much and too little to be sure. Practical
reason is risky business, and so we have to take responsibility for our
decisions. Deliberative and practical situations are not determined and
necessary, where we could know enough and so not need to do anything.
Deliberative situations are not conditions of chance, where we can't
know enough to make a rational decision. Kahn's "too little and too
much" lies between necessity and chance.
But there are a few features unique to legal reasoning. First of all,
legal reasoning-including legal reasoning beyond litigation, about
which Mootz and Sherwin 6 remind us-is controversial. There is a
conflict of pleas. Most of the legal reasoning we hear, including hear
from ourselves and judges, is interested and partisan. We try to figure
out the right thing to do in situations that beg for a hermeneutics of
suspicion. How to be trustworthy and how to trust others in such a
situation calls for virtues of character and intellect specific to law and its
conventions. The difference between reasoning and rationalizing is
different, I've learned, in law and in philosophy.7
Second, in legal reasoning and not in practical reasoning in general,
there are losers. Legal judgments often force people to do things they
wouldn't do otherwise. Deliberation can at least aspire to ideals like
4. Kahn, supra note 1, at 939.
5. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF Civic DISCOURSE (George A. Kennedy
ed., 1991).
6. Richard K. Sherwin, On Being Among Friends: A Response to Eugene Garver's
For the Sake of Argument, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 945 (2006).
7. In Eugene Garver, Can Virtue be Bought? 37 PHIL. AND RHET. 353 (2004), I look
at Socrates' performance in the Protagoras as confronting exactly this problem.
Anything the Sophists say is designed to attract clients, and Socrates says will be heard as
part of that same contest.
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Pareto optimality, in which everyone is happy with the result. Legal
reasoning can't always have that hope. This also sets unique demands on
the legal thos. I'll talk about Brown v. Board of Education8 below, but
part of the ethical task the Justices conceived for themselves in Brown
was to try to ensure that the losers saw themselves as not fully rejected.
(It may be that the failures of Brown that Kahn talks about come from
too much attention to this ethical task.)
I find a third difference between legal reasoning and practical
reason in general. As I argue in the book, the autonomy of practical
reason makes trust central. But central to the autonomy of law is
authority. Where Kahn has made the reason/will topos central for talking
about justification and obedience, I use the logos/ethos topos for talking
about trust and authority.9 This is rational and ethical authority because a
court has "neither sword nor purse."'10 Plato's Phaedrus and Lysis offer
profound meditations on the relation between friendship, which we
assume to be symmetrical, and ros, which all assume to be
asymmetrical. My book, on the other hand, examines the relation
between trust, a symmetrical relationship requiring a certain degree of
equality, and authority, an asymmetrical relationship which requires
inequality. Legal ethos is unique in its need to combine trust and
authority. My book is about trust, and about the relation between
thought and character that develops in what I call the circumstances of
friendship. Legal argument has a central place in the operations of trust
and authority today.
Fourth, lawyers speak for clients, and judges speak in the name of
the people and the law. Rhetoricians began in ancient Greece by
ghostwriting speeches because parties had to speak for themselves.
There is, however, a long tradition of the rhetorical problems of speaking
in the name of someone else, as diplomats do, or speaking in the name of
the law and of the people, as judges do. I'll talk below about the role of
emotions in legal reasoning, but in practical reasoning in general I am
entitled to my own emotions. They might be unwise, but if my feelings
of loyalty, say, dispose me to look at a situation in a specific way, I can
see things through the lens of loyalty. Judges are not entitled to their
own passions, but must represent the emotions of the community. Kahn
talks about the disappearance of the subject in legal discourse, and I am
interested in the ethical implications of this suppression."
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. I have in mind especially PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V.
MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997) and PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY
AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1992).
10. THE FEDERALIST No.78 (Alexander Hamilton).
11. For a nice consideration of these problems, see Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal
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II. Next, I want to focus on what Kahn calls the "mysterious
middle moment of decision" that lies between the experience, on reading
briefs on both sides of a case, of equipoise and the decision, followed by
a sense of necessity.' 2 Often we not only think of it as mysterious, but as
scandalous-we shouldn't move comfortably and instantly from a
conflict of persuasive probable arguments to a conviction that one side is
necessarily right.
This mysterious moment is such a commonplace experience that we
shouldn't assume that it must be irrational or otherwise wrong. It may
be; there are lots of ways in which common human behavior is nothing
to be proud of. But I think we should approach the mysterious moment
without prejudging whether we should condemn or justify such behavior.
For the same reason, I don't want quickly to condemn the mystery as
judicial posturing and bluffing, pretending that things are more settled
than they really are. That seems to me an inadequate story because we
behave the same in private as in public. When we make an individual
decision in the face of incomplete information, we are able to act
decisively, and our conclusions become relatively impervious to further
evidence. It is hard to change our minds once we have made them up.
Kahn's mystery violates a principle of the ethics of belief often
called evidentialism, derived from Locke's worries about the rationality
of religious belief. This theory declares that the rational person gives
assent in proportion to the evidence.
Here is Locke's formulation:
Faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which if it be
regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything, but upon
good reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes,
without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own
fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience
due his maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he
has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does
not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on
truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the
luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his
proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for
whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the
light and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover
truth, by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in
Profession 's Rule Against Vouching For Clients: Advocacy and "The Manner that is the
Man Himself," 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 145 (1993).
12. Kahn, supra note 1, at 935.
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doing his duty as a rational creature, that though he should miss truth,
he will not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right, and
places it as he should, who. in any case or matter whatsoever, believes
or disbelieves, according as reason directs him. He that does
otherwise, transgresses against his own light, and misuses those
faculties, which were given him.'
3
The more probable a conclusion, the more firmly I should hold to it.
By that standard, the typical judicial performance is inept, and probably
dishonest. On the other hand, if there is a difference between legitimacy
and justice, and a gap---to be filled by ethos-between a legitimate
argument and a just decision, then these violations of evidentialism are
not irrational. Judicial reasoning, and practical reasoning in general,
requires an analysis that goes beyond the tools that logic can offer. We
need to distinguish the legitimacy of argument from the justice of a
decision. Legitimate arguments produce legitimate objects of belief,
things I may believe. Beyond that is not an arbitrary choice of which
alternative interpretation I ought to accept, as James argues in "The Will
to Believe,"'14 but a responsible and ethical decision. I choose it because
it is right, but it is right-I stand behind it-because I chose it. The
challenge is to think of this process as other than willful-I think it good
because I desire it. The issue is when that is a vicious circle and when it
is legitimate.
The opposition between Lockean evidentialism and Kahn's mystery
is matched by an opposition between two conceptions of reasoning.
According to contemporary logic the test of cogency is that there is
nothing in the conclusion of an inference that is not already in the
premises. If my premises are only probable-and the fact that I have
selected from among options shows that they are only probable-the
conclusion can be at most as probable as the least among them. If there's
more in the conclusion than in the evidence, whether more content or
more firmness of conviction, then something went wrong.
Legal reasoning and rhetoric follow older models of logic in which
novelty is a sign of vigor and rationality, a sign that real thinking is going
on. When practical reason is ampliative-and a central part of the
13. JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 73 (1689). Hume
makes the same point more briefly, and without Locke's rationale: "A wise man,
therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence." DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 110 (L. A.
Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). See also PETER STRAWSON,
INTRODUCTION TO LOGICAL THEORY 257 (1952), quoted in JONATHAN E. ADLER, BELIEF'S
OwN ETHICS 309 (2002) ("'being reasonable' means that one proportion the degree of
one's convictions to the strength of the evidence").
14. WILLIAM JAMES, Essays in Pragmatism, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE 88-109 (1896).
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argument of my book, especially chapter 4, is that good practical
reasoning is ampliative-we move from probability to confidence.
Rhetorical and legal reasoning don't move from probability to
certainty-that's a fallacy by any standards-but from probability to
confidence. This is the crucial move from a legitimate argument to a just
decision. Practical reason is ampliative because it moves, via ethos but
never irrationally, from probability to confidence. Maybe not faith in
things unseen, but at least commitment and confidence that go beyond
the evidence. 5
Practical conclusions often are not only held more firmly than the
evidence they start from, but also they often have greater scope than the
evidence itself licenses, and so practical reason is ampliative and
mysterious in a second respect. Judicial reasoning often must both
resolve a particular issue before a court and speak to more general issues.
Like practical reason in general, legal reasoning wrestles with the
mystery of how to do justice to the parties to a dispute and do justice in a
larger sense. Once we see that legally segregated schools are unjust, we
come to see-it may take time, but it doesn't take further evidence or
further reasoning-that other forms of inequality are wrong too.
There is a third ampliative dimension. Practical reasoning, and
legal reasoning in particular, moves from is to ought, from facts to a
practical conclusion about what is to be done. Hume, who knew
something about Lockean evidentialism, taught us that this is a fallacy.
But we reason practically from is to ought by finding the implicit moral
structure and value within the facts. This is the discovery of narrative
about which Sherwin and Kahn write. We need character to derive ought
from is. We need ethos to find implicit moral structure and value within
the facts. Logic alone won't get us from is to ought.
The ampliative nature of practical reasoning, the confidence and
15. ADLER, supra note 13, at 232, 237. Adler usefully distinguishes between the
roles of full and partial belief in our lives. Id. at 232.
Full belief, in contrast to partial belief, facilitates (intentional) action. Partial
belief regularly calls for significantly greater hesitation and calculation ...
Partial belief, however, in this respect is more like desire. It points inward to
the believer (his degree of confidence), as desire points inward to how one
wants the world to be.... When one holds a partial belief, one may look to the
world for further evidence of its truth. But one cannot look through one's
attitude ... to the content as expressing a feature of the world, since one does
not (yet) take the world to be that way. In partially believing that p, however
strongly, we recognize a gap between our attitude and the way the world is.
But with full belief there is no gap-from my first-person point of view there is
no difference between my believing p and this being the case that p.... Since
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content and normative direction that go beyond its premises, comes from
character, ethos. I can't know more than the evidence provides, but I can
claim more, and be committed to more. I don't add additional evidence
concerning my own feelings and desires about the case. That would be
cheating. If we think of practical reasoning as theoretical reasoning, this
is cheating. I stake my character. That performance gives the audience
an additional persuasive reason. I hold myself responsible for decisions
over and above the extent to which the facts and legitimate arguments
suggest the decision.
The mystery of commitment, of moving from doubt to confidence,
is an instance of the more general phenomenon of the difference between
the contingencies of the future and the necessities of the past. The future
looks open; how it turns out depends on us. The past looks inevitable.
Once things have happened in a certain way, reality suppresses the
alternative, unrealized possibilities. They once were probable, and now
are impossible. One probability has become a necessity.
In moving from conflicting and incomplete evidence to a decisive
judgment, we do add something, although I don't think it helpful to call
it a premise. We add the thought that it is time to come to a decision.
Aristotle supplies a model for deliberation in Ethics III: we start with a
posited end, and deliberate until we have constructed a causal chain that
goes from what we can do up to the end. 16 We know when deliberation
is over. It's over when it's complete. Most practical deliberation doesn't
work that way. Sometimes there is an external constraint that tells us
when deliberation is finished, although not complete. Time's up. At
other times we may decide that further inquiry is unlikely to be worth the
trouble, or will only make things more controversial, or should be
avoided for other reasons. Reasonable people can reasonably differ on
whether to end inquiry. But when an inquiry or deliberation is finished,
that is itself then a reason not to revisit the evidence. That, then, is a
reason we become more confident in our judgment. At that point, the
alternatives to the decision, such as reexamining the evidence, no longer
are attractive, and no longer have the standing they had just before the
decision.
These ampliative features of practical reasoning account for the
further mystery that once a decision is made, it becomes resistant to
change. We are more confident than the evidence alone would justify,
and so once we make a decision, new evidence has less weight. Our
conclusion is broader than the evidence that leads to it, and so new
evidence counts for less because it now has to be evidence against the
16. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence C. Irwin, trans., Hackett Publishing
Co. 1985).
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more general conclusion, not the narrower one against which it could
have counted before the decision. Finally, because our practical
reasoning moves from is to ought, the decision must be more resistant to
revision. What we ought to do is less susceptible to refutation than what
is the case.
There is another familiar legal mystery, though, that we should
juxtapose with Kahn's. It is a common experience in practical reasoning
and in legal reasoning that our decisions are often better than the reasons
we are able to offer. (We have to be careful not to be romantic about
this. We also often make bad decisions on reasons we can't offer.
Sometimes making our reasons public stops us from doing something
wrong.) It is possible to explain this by claming that the reasons we
present are really just rationalizations. We act on instinct or feeling, and
for public consumption mask our desires and emotions in rational
covering. Hence attacks on the autonomy of law and of legal reasoning.
Hence the common opinion that Brown-and Roe v. Wade17 for some-
is a right result but a bad opinion.
A better interpretation of the mystery comes from Aristotle's
discussion of maxims in Rhetoric 11.21.18 Maxims are persuasive
because the good speaker is able to put into words what we think but
cannot say. When we encounter such a speaker we'll follow her
anywhere. One measure of a great judicial performance is that what
seemed unlikely or wrong before the argument looks self-evidently and
inevitably right after it. (This is often how dissents become precedents.)
The ability to articulate what most of us can't express is sometimes a
matter of cleverness and skill, as in logical reconstruction, but sometimes
requires virtues of thought and character. The logician is not an
impressive character, and his skill gives me no reason to trust him in
persuasive contexts, but the person who can formulate wise maxims has
earned my trust.
But I think there's an even better story to be told about this mystery.
We are opaque to ourselves. "On any important decision we deliberate
together because we do not trust ourselves." 19 I want to juxtapose that
line of Aristotle's with one from Scallen's 20 hero, Cicero: an argument is
"something probable worked up to create confidence., 21 Logic as the
17. 410U.S. 113(1975).
18. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5.
19. ARISTOTLE, supra note 16.
20. Eileen A. Scallen, Nobody Likes a Sophist Until They Need One, 110 PENN ST. L.
REv. 923 (2006).
21. CICERO, THE GENRES OF RHETORIC (John F. Tinkler, trans., 1995). The Greek
word, pistis, translated in my Aristotle citation as trust, has the same range of meanings
as the Latinfides translated here as confidence.
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analysis of arguments misses the way in which making something
explicit transforms it. Stating a principle is not an innocent act. If
character is the true soul of practical reasoning, it is not always best
articulated in an explicit principle. Making self-conscious our logos,
ethos and pathos are different kinds of acts. The advantages that come
from making reasoning explicit are not advantages when ethos and
pathos become explicit.
22
Awareness of character, of the dependence of how we think on who
we are, is different from awareness of hidden premises. That is why
analyzing a persuasive argument sometimes looks like explaining a
joke-the analysis might explain, but it isn't funny, and isn't persuasive.
Attempts to persuade directly through an appeal to character are very
prone to backfire, as in the notorious, "Trust me; I'm not a crook."
When we make a logical appeal explicit, we come to give it the credit it
deserves. Clarification exhibits strengths and weaknesses. But I can
defeat your ethical arguments by making them explicit. Fairly
characterizing the logical structure of an argument is a purely descriptive
act, while there are no neutral characterizations of thos. If I say, "your
argument depends on our trusting you because of your superior
experience in these matters," your argument is weaker. To show that an
appeal to character or emotion has a rational structure makes it less
effective as an appeal to character or emotion.
When these arguments are propounded in a richer and more flowing
style... they more easily escape the captious criticism of the
Academics; but when they are expressed more briefly and sparingly as
Zeno used to do, they are more exposed to rebuttal. A river in spate
suffers little or no pollution, whereas an enclosed pool gets easily sullied;
and likewise the critic's censure is diluted by a stream of eloquence,
whereas the narrow confines of circumscribed argument cannot readily
defend themselves.23
Expressing a passion transforms the passion. Some of our most
persuasive arguments are hard to defend because they are driven by
emotion. We see a situation differently because of anger, love, or shame.
"The emotions are those things through which, by undergoing change,
through which people come to differ in their judgments and which are
accompanied by pain and pleasure. 24 "Pleasure, genus of emotions.' 25
"When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of
22. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 949 ("What was distinctive about the narrative turn
in contemporary philosophy and jurisprudence was precisely its recognition of the
inadequacy of abstract principles as a basis for judgment.").
23. CICERO, THE NATURE OF THE GODS 54 (P.G. Welsh, trans., 1997).
24. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5.
25. Id.
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thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something
totally different or the same thing with a different intensity: when they
feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgment, they
regard him as having done little wrong, if any; when they feel hostile,
they take the opposite view. 26 If I can convince you so that we share the
assessment that this situation appropriately dictates an angry response,
you will find my reasons compelling. They won't be reasons for
everyone, but they are reasons that bind us together. Kahn's mystery that
I started with, the experience of conflicting plausible argument followed
by a sense of necessity, demands that we understand the role of emotion
in our practical reasoning. These are emotions that bring people together
in friendship.
III. While only two of the eight chapters of the book are about
Brown, Kahn is right to insist on it as a test case for my picture of reason
and character. I chose to focus only a single case rather than range more
broadly because Brown uncovers important facets of practical reasoning.
One thing the autonomy of law means is that we have to deliberate and
debate about whether Brown is a good opinion. There is no scientific or
historical proof of Brown's excellence or failure that lies beyond
practical reason of the kind Gerald Rosenberg, for example, attempts.27
Fifty years on, Brown is unfashionable, although Kahn's reasons for
criticizing it are as unfashionable as my praise for it.
I see at least three legacies of Brown relevant to judging the Court's
thos and ethical performance. First, Brown was about school
desegregation. Schools today are as segregated as they were fifty years
ago. The Court was insufficiently courageous, and that's why schools
have stayed segregated. That, I take it, is Kahn's argument.
Second, Brown made equal protection into anti-discrimination, and
elevated equality into a basic legal value of our society. Equality moved
from being part of the language of law-equal protection-into part of
the language of politics. That is a measure of success for a judicial
opinion. Wheel-chair ramps, I tell my students, are the most visible
signs of affirmative action today. That is the narrative about Brown that
I favor.
Put those two stories together and we discover that the affirmation
that equality is an overriding value, and racial discrimination merely an
especially egregious denial of equality, turned out to be a failure with
respect to racial discrimination in public education, while the meaning of
Brown successfully extended all over American life. "The meaning of
26. Id.
27. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
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Brown-its 6thos-survives in the ethical surplus of the argument. That
ethical surplus is the anti-discrimination model which commits the Court
to desegregation beyond schools. Brown's meaning is its understanding
of equality and discrimination." Through an irony of history that needs
exploring, the per curiam decisions are not controversial while the
central holding is. Since I argue that the per curiam decisions and
Boiling v. Sharpe28 represent examples of pure ethical argument, on this
verdict of history my account of Brown and my understanding of
practical reason seem vindicated against Kahn's. As I say in the book
about Boiling:
The ultimate ethical argument is the announcement of a per curiam
decision, where everything is tacit. The companion case, Boiling v.
Sharpe, which ruled against segregated schools in the District of
Columbia, comes close .... Nothing could be a more purely ethical
argument. Constitutional text does not seem to help; legislative
history is on the wrong side. Here is a logically weak rationale for an
ethically strong conclusion, and Warren signals the weakness by the
double negative, "not mutually exclusive." Brown has changed the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. "Reverse incorporation," applying
implications from the Fourteen to the Fifth Amendment, makes the
Court's [own] reasoning the ultimate ground for the decision.
Practical reasoning creates 6thos. The authority for Boiling is
Brown 29
But there is a third legacy of Brown, and a third way of looking at
its ethos and its ethical meaning and effect. Brown changed the rule of
law into the rule of courts. Kahn criticizes the Court for not sufficiently
taking responsibility for its decisions. Starting with Cooper v. Aaron,
30
and leading to cases like City of Boerne v. Flores,31 the Court has
affirmed that it not only has the last word, but the only word, on
constitutional meaning. I think this is a legacy of Brown that neither of
us would celebrate. But all these are elaborations through history of an
aspect of the 6thos of Brown.
IV. This third way of talking about the effects of Brown leads to a
question, engendered by all three responses. Rhetoric is about the power
of words. Marx says that men make their own history, but they don't
make it as they please. Rhetoric shows how to do things with words, but
human discourse is not omnipotent: when I say, "Let there be light,"
nothing might happen. The good rhetorician exercises the virtue of
28. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
29. GARVER, supra note 3, at 82.
30. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
31. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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knowing how much his or her own speech can effect, how much to leave
in the hands of audiences of different kinds. The same goes for
rhetorical criticism, of which For the Sake of Argument, is an example.
How do we decide if the Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC")
was a success? Lincoln's Second Inaugural? Brown? These evaluations
depend on assumptions we make about the power of words. When Kahn
and Mootz criticize Warren for being political, and I praise him, we
differ over the power of words. When Kahn notes that today's public
schools are as segregated as they were in 1954, or when Sherwin notes
that the former victims of apartheid in. South Africa remain as poor as
before, they are observing the limited power of words. Even the best
practical reason is not simply performative: saying doesn't always make
it So.,,
Legal rhetoric confronts specific and very interesting problems
about the limited power of words. These are problems that I don't
explore in the book, but that my critics show need serious investigation.
We can talk about the intention and effects of To Kill a Mockingbird,
Birth of a Nation, Gone with the Wind, or The Passion of the Christ. We
can think about the relation between intention and effect. But legal
rhetoric often has an additional performative dimension lacking in the
powerful discursive performances we think of as aesthetic, or in clearly
political yet nonofficial performances, such as flag burning. Legal words
do something. Their doing something might be minor compared with the
effects of the words-on some understandings of gay marriage the
performative that weds a couple is a small effect compared with the sky
falling as a consequence. But there are special problems relating the two.
Many of Austin's initial examples in speech act theory are legal: "I now
pronounce you man and wife." "We find the defendant guilty." "I
promise to love, honor and obey., 33 Scallen's concern with gay marriage
is clearly a battle over the power of words. An appropriate official can
marry two people, but the issue people -fight about isn't performative
rhetoric, but the power of words: can this couple being married debase
other people's marriages? Does gay marriage mean equal citizenship?
Does a denial of gay marriage mean caste and subordination?
The important new and legal problem here is the relation between
the performative action and the wider effects. It's one thing, for
example, to say that the TRC's exposure of wrongdoing and the
opportunity it gave to victims to tell their stories created community in
32. ANTJIE KROG, COUNTRY OF MY SKULL: GUILT, SORROW, AND THE LIMITS OF
FORGIVENESS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1999) (telling the story of a woman who
eloquently makes Sherwin's point).
33. J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
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South Africa; it's quite another to say that their legal power to confer
amnesty created community. The verb "created" points to different
things and different causal connections in the two cases. It's one thing to
say that Brown introduced and made compelling a new vocabulary of
equality and anti-discrimination. The powerful images of Birth of a
Nation could in the same way make compelling a shared vision of race
and history. There is an additional question specific to law about
whether the Brown verdict that separate but equal is impossible led to
those effects. What kind of connection is being asserted between the
performative of the verdict and the wider cultural changes? Part of the
power of words is their power to invite or compel more words-rebuttal,
development, redescription, parody, reduction to clich&. Elsewhere I've
argued that it is fatuous to believe that posting the Ten Commandments
will reduce teen pregnancy, but the real issue people are fighting over is
the connection between an official performative act and the wider effects
of the posting.34 The general form of that question needs a lot more
reflection.
Scallen's example of gay marriage, like my example of posting the
Ten Commandments, shows something about how powerful many
people think words and symbols are, and how powerful official
pronouncements are frequently taken to be. Is this just magical thinking,
or is something more involved? The white southerners who wanted to
impeach Earl Warren resisted integration until Congress started attaching
its "purse" to the Court's judgments. So, what were they fighting about?
Part of it is the strong desire to feel that the state is on our side, which
clearly is at work in the gay marriage disputes. But I think there's more.
Isolating official speech acts is similar to isolating law. There are
borderline cases between law and politics, texts that don't carry official
authority and yet try to do something performative with words. I can
only note in passing-because I don't know what more to do with it-the
example of the Declaration of Independence. It claims performative
power for itself: "these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be free
and independent. . . ,35 If it succeeds, it is self-legitimating. Although it
serves as inspiration, as it did for Lincoln, it almost never serves as a
legal precedent.
The question of the power of words bears on another comment of
Kahn's, again in criticism of the Brown decision and/or my praise for it.
Kahn says: "if ethos involves responsibility, then the Court must not
34. Eugene Garver, At The Intersection of Politics and Religion: Posting the Ten
Commandments, LAW, CULT. & HUMAN. (forthcoming 2006).
35. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
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only articulate rights but also ensure their realization. 36 But ensuring
their realization does not mean that the Court must provide a regulatory
plan. One aspect of political wisdom that should be part of legal
reasoning is deciding who should realize and enforce rights. The Court
can be more powerful by making others do what's right, and even more
powerful by getting others to think that they are voluntarily doing what's
right.
Kahn notes that one of the circumstances of legal reasoning is the
pressure of time. I think the Court in Brown worried about a different
kind of time constraint. The South African TRC worried about the
length of its hearings, sacrificing justice and truth in the name of getting
a report out quickly enough for the public still to support the inquiry. Of
course we can now see that the Court miscalculated, and that white
resistance was more massive and more lawless than they believed it
would be. They made a judgment of practical reason about deliberate
speed, and the judgment was wrong. They thought, or hoped, that if the
opinion were "non-accusatory" there would be less resentment and more
cooperation. Here too they were wrong. It is worth noting that these
miscalculations were not due to the fact that the Court was politically
naive or that its members were drawn from a narrow academic class
without political experience. That charge can be leveled against the
contemporary Court, but not the Warren Court. Maybe on the contrary,
the Warren Court overrated its political sense.
I read the political calculations of Brown this way. They proposed
that the white South be forced to be equal. The best of all possible
outcomes was that the white South voluntarily would do the right thing.
Clearly they weren't going to do the right thing unless ordered to. The
Court hoped that the order would be enough, and that compliance would
be voluntary. If it weren't, the order would be as ineffective as the First
Reconstruction, and for the same reason. After not very long, the rest of
the country would grow impatient and say that blacks had received
enough special help and that it was time for them to make it on their
own, time for the law to be color-blind. They tried to avoid the coercion
of the First Reconstruction, but got the same result all the same.
V. Both Kahn and Sherwin note the perversions of history by
which we now have a color-blind Constitution that tells us to be ignorant
of the continuing problems of race in America. Color-blindness, at least
in many current interpretations, is a paradigm for reason without
character. The whole point is to be purely formal, neutral, and not
sentimental or responsive to special pleading, and to claim that stance as
a legal virtue. An thos of the American community develops in that
36. Kahn, supra note 1, at 943.
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formal meaning of the color-blind Constitution. It represents an
eagerness to affirm values such as equality without being willing to do
anything to achieve them, a return to something like Harlan's distinction
of social from legal equality in his Plessy v. Ferguson37 dissent. The
current rhetoric of self-reliance and freedom permits us to feel good
about ourselves while maintaining a gap between our ideals and our
policies.
We the people discovered, in the years after 1954, what a
commitment to racial equality entailed. We the people rejected the price
as too high. We therefore redefined racial equality as something we
could afford. One of the signs of ethical argument, which Kahn notes in
Bolling, is that something is declared unthinkable. If the Court
successfully speaks for the community, it will indeed be unthinkable.
But it is an ethical argument, and so revisable. What used to be
unthinkable becomes thinkable. An older term for the unthinkable was
the shameful, and it is worth looking at Plato's dialogues for ways in
which shame is used as a principle of ethical inference. Not everyone
will respond to such an appeal to shame, and not everyone will agree that
something is unthinkable.
Kahn says: "Under our "color-blind" Constitution, these
inequalities are legally noncognizable: they are invisible., 38 In my first
chapter I talk about democratic knowledge, knowledge possessed by a
community, not simply by a set of individuals, something like
Rousseau's distinction between the general will and the will of all. And
corresponding to the idea of democratic knowledge is that of democratic
ignorance.
Each of us might know something that we as a community cannot
know, and so cannot use as the basis for deliberations. We need such
ignorance most clearly in judicial contexts. There are truths that are not
admissible as evidence .... But we also exclude some things that each
of us knows from deliberative rhetoric. Each of us might know that
women live longer than men, and that white Americans live longer than
black Americans. However, as a public we are ignorant of these data.
We cannot use them, for example, as the basis for arguing that women
should pay more into retirement accounts than men, or that blacks should
pay more than whites for medical insurance. We are democratically
ignorant of these facts, as of many other facts about race, gender and
class. Maybe we should be. But whether we should be or not, the
reasons we can share depend not only on what the reasons are but on
37. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896).
38. Kahn, supra note 1, at 943.
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who we are."
39
The color-blind Constitution is an example of democratic ignorance.
Practical knowledge is knowledge about what to do. We can't know
things we can't do anything about. In this case, we won't know things
we choose not to do anything about. Democratic ignorance includes
hiding from ourselves the fact that this is a choice. "If Gene's general
view of the need for ethos is correct, the inadequacy of Brown may tell
us something important about the ultimate collapse of the Second
Reconstruction Movement." 40 Brown revealed something "inadequate"
about America: an unwillingness to make a practical commitment to
racial equality. Truly equal education would mean facing "unthinkable"
realities about property taxes, municipal boundaries and other things
we'd like to think of as natural rather than subject to deliberation.
We need to think more about the unprincipled nature of the Brown
decision, because I think Kahn's differences with me point out
something else about ethical argument. Just because no principle is
explicit and unambiguous in the decision doesn't make it unprincipled. I
think Brown develops an ethical principle, and that it need not be stated
in a proposition as a logical or scientific principle might be. Announcing
a principle is not necessarily a useful way of doing that, as the Court
found in Roe v Wade. The Warren Court's failure to announce an
explicit principle in Brown was not necessarily disingenuous, and not
necessarily a failure.
The Court in Brown articulated a principle, not by making it
explicit, but by focusing attention on a great wrong. Lochner v. New
York4' and Roe didn't do that. Bakers working long hours was not a stain
on the nation's conscience demanding remedy, as school segregation
was. Even restrictions on abortion did not as evidently restrict freedom
or equality as much as school segregation did; a case that had to be made
because the wrongs and rights are private and out of sight, which is why
most Americans think they support a right to abortion and at the same
time support restrictions that would make that right empty for most
people. The obviousness of the wrong of segregation made the kind of
articulation of principle Kahn wants unnecessary. When character and
emotion are so easily in play, a principle in the form of a proposition
could be out of place and can backfire rhetorically.
VI. Sherwin rightly draws a connection between my work and
MacIntyre's. He notes the cast of characters at the beginning of After
Virtue, and MacIntyre's complaint that philosophy cannot solve our
39. GARVER, supra note 3, at 40.
40. Kahn, supra note 1, at 941.
41. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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contemporary problems. Maclntyre's point is that philosophy has a
practical function in some societies and not others, and that it is an
indictment of a society that philosophy doesn't have a function. Sherwin
poses the problem as one of character and fate. I would put it slightly
differently. Maclntyre raises the problem of when one has a character
not suited to the times. Everyone is in favor of friendship and treating
each other well, but are the virtues of trust and friendship possible in our
dark times? Don't they presuppose a context in which people already
treat each other well, so that I all have to do is join in? And if that
context is missing, my friendly arguments will either not be heard or not
heard as friendly.
So, to recall Scallen's title, if I were sued, of course I'd want a
shtarker for a lawyer. Of course I'd opt for, as Sherwin puts it, Karl
Rove or Machiavelli over Aristotle. There's no conflict between good
guys and bad buys, friendly philosophers against Sophists or economic
reasoners. The conflict lies within each of us, between what I need and
what I want to be. I would put the difference between Maclntyre's
project and mine this way: where he thinks that the only way to avoid
the dark ages is to invest energy in new local forms of community with a
material basis, reenacting Aristotle's arguments about autarchy, I direct
attention-and hope-to exemplary performances. I emphasize
especially public and verbal discursive performances because of their
visibility and accessibility. This is the Machiavelli in me. I try to reason
from the great examples in the past and at the same time learn an art of
judgment that lets me identify and criticize those great examples.
Sherwin asks what general morals to draw from my examples. I don't
think this puts him with Kahn complaining about Brown's lack of
explicit principle, but I would prefer to draw attention to the work
needed to learn from the examples. Disputing over Brown-and I would
include Mootz' remarks about affirmative action here-improves our
reflective judgment through concentration on such a rich example. Such
powerful judging capacity, rather than a general moral, is my aim.
Philosophy is in one respect in better shape than rhetoric and
practical reason today. When philosophy doesn't have a function, it isn't
philosophy's fault but society's. But rhetoric has always been concerned
with getting people to listen, so can't get off that easily. A bad audience
is not necessarily an excuse. If practical reason and rational rhetoric
aren't successful, part of the blame must be placed on the rhetoric itself.
One dimension of the power of legal rhetoric that Sherwin points to is a
distinction between public and private language, such as the language
and thought of race in the United States, which tracks my distinction
between democratic knowledge and the knowledge of all. I use the TRC
to suggest how rational discourse can come into existence and function
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even in unlikely and critical situations. The hope that lies behind the
book is that greater understanding and self-consciousness about rational
persuasion will help us find it in unexpected places. Being able to
recognize it for what it is, we can practice it more effectively.
Both Sherwin and Scallen note that a lot of my book is about
friendship and trust. Sherwin asks pertinent questions about why
friendship and trust seem in the air these days. He also wonders whether
writing the book was act of friendship, and so asks how one can reply in
kind. Scallen contends that my slighting of the Sophists and the Greco-
Roman tradition of humanist rhetoric, the lineage from Isocrates through
Cicero and Quintilian, is unfriendly. It isn't guilt by association, but
guilt by following my models, Plato and Aristotle: Aristotle for ignoring
the Sophists, and Plato for treating them uncharitably in his dialogues. I
contend that Aristotle doesn't take the Sophists seriously because he
seems to assume that their intellectual poverty means that they aren't
worrisome practically either. If that's the basis for his dismissal, if he
thinks that the only serious practical challenges are serious intellectual
challenges, we might wonder in what sort of world that basis could make
sense. But Scallen mostly shifts the ground from Aristotle to Plato, and
wonders how I can talk about friendship when Plato treats the Sophists
and their followers without friendship and without an attempt to
understand them sympathetically.
42
I think this is a very fruitful question. First, we have to distinguish
the lack of charity on Plato's part from the same failure by Socrates.
Socrates, the dramatic character, willfully misunderstands the other
characters in the dialogues, some of whom are Sophists, some of whom
are students of Sophists, and treats just as badly people who have nothing
to do with the Sophists. Plato, the author, willfully misrepresents some
historical characters, some of whom are Sophists and some their
followers. Neither of them has any interest in historical accuracy or
fidelity. The idea that we can understand a text or a person without
regard for the truth of what is said is completely alien to Socrates and
Plato-indeed the separation of meaning from truth had to wait a couple
of thousand years. Spinoza seems the first to make such a distinction.
We have to be careful not to impose a distinction between meaning and
truth that comes from biblical hermeneutics on rhetorical and discursive
situations in general. Socrates is not interested in being fair to Gorgias.
He wants to know the truth about Gorgias' art of rhetoric.
In my book, especially in chapter 2, I talk about how one can treat
42. My own confrontation between Aristotle and Isocrates appears in Eugene
Garver, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Civic Education in Aristotle and Isocrates, in
ISOCRATES AND Civic EDUCATION 157-185 (David Depew & Takis Poulakis eds., 2004).
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rationally and with friendship someone one is trying to defeat in
argument, or someone one is trying to persuade. I am interested in how
practical rationality can be faithful to its own standards while still trying
to win an argument. The Platonic examples create an analogous but
different problem. Socrates' desire to understand Gorgias isn't trumped
or compromised by his desire to win the argument; it is apparently
trumped or compromised by his desire to learn the truth. It looks as
though anything Gorgias says is simply instrumental towards Socrates'
higher goal. Fairness then becomes beside the point. Is friendship
possible in such circumstances? In other words, is Socrates' desire for
the truth incompatible with friendship of any kind, since that
commitment dictates an instrumental, and therefore unfriendly, relation
to anyone to whom he talks? I'm not asking whether Socrates'
commitment to truth excuses him from duties of charity and friendship
the rest of us have. I want to know instead whether his commitment
allows him to redefine charity and friendship such that he is in fact
treating Gorgias, and maybe even Callicles, with friendship.
There is, as I note in the book, an ambiguity in "charity" that carries
over to trust. I quote these words from Donald Davidson: "Charity is
forced on us: whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others,
we must count them right in most matters. 43 To understand anyone, we
have to assume that most of what they say is true. We have to assume
that they are rational beings, responsive to evidence, with senses in
working order, and with a common set of background knowledge. I trust
everyone. I assume that people I speak with understand my language-
recall that Socrates' only precondition for talking to the slave in the
Meno was that the slave speak Greek. I assume that when Scallen and I
argue about the Phaedrus we share a commitment to consult a common
text if necessary. All such assumptions are obviously defeasible.
But that sense of charity is distinct from a charity and trust that we
do parcel out judiciously. Some people are more trustworthy than others.
If I find that you're the sort of person to look for things I say to take out
of context in order to ridicule me, then I don't trust you, and either avoid
you or at least speak with you in a much more guarded way. Some
people earn and others forfeit our trust. Here I think lie the interesting
questions about what friendship can mean in difficult times. Socrates in
the Crito argues that his commitment to act justly is unaffected by
whether others act unjustly towards him. Should he treat similarly the
same someone who shares his commitment to discover truth and
someone who is only interested in victory? What would a friendly
attitude of Socrates towards Gorgias, or Callicles, look like? How, if at
43. DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 197 (1984).
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all, would it be different from how Socrates in fact-in the fiction of the
Gorgias-treats Gorgias and Callicles?
VII. To summarize briefly. I have enumerated six places for
further inquiry stimulated by the responses to For the Sake of Argument.
First, my readers' surprising interpretation of the book as an account of
the autonomy of law generated questions about some unique problems of
legal reasoning. Legal reasoning is by nature controversial, so draws the
line between reasoning and rationalizing at a different place from, for
example, philosophical reasoning. There is always space for losers.
Legal reasoning relies on authority and representation, so the legal agent
is not autonomous in 'the easy sense in which moral agents often are.
The ethical implications of these features of legal reasoning remain to be
explored.
Second, we need to think more about the ampliative nature of
practical reason, the way practical reason allows us to commit ourselves
to more than the evidence compels. The nature of commitment as an
ethical act deserves further development.
Third, competing narratives about the place of the Brown decision
in our history brings attention to the rhetorical problem of how to judge
among competing versions of history. Judgments about history are
inevitably judgments about ourselves and our futures. If we see Brown
as a success or a triumph, we will see ourselves as facing certain
possibilities for the future. If we see it as a failure, the future as a field
for deliberation will look quite different. This leads to the fourth topic.
It is a rhetorical virtue that requires the highest uses of practical
wisdom to understand the power of words, to know how much can be
accomplished by a speech act, such as a declaration that segregated
schools are incompatible with the values of equality expressed in the
Fourteenth Amendment." Academics may naturally be prone to
overestimate how much words accomplish, how much can be affected
with neither sword nor purse. But Scallen's example of gay marriage
shows that academics are not alone in worshipping and fearing the power
of words. The power of an argument to compel a conclusion operates in
such a different space from the power of that argument to compel belief,
obedience, and action that it is extremely difficult to speak coherently
about the two together. This seems to me a major challenge for future
inquiry.
Fifth, I argue for the need for ethical interpretations of practical
reasoning. Ethical principles need not be expressed as logical principles.
Kahn and Sherwin have shown the need to say more here. Using logical
criteria, I can tell when a decision is principled and when not. But how
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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can one make the corresponding demarcation between an ethically
principled decision and ethical opportunism?
Finally, there are issues concerned with friendship itself. We all
have to face questions about what friendship could mean in
circumstances of radical disagreement and diversity. At the beginning of
the book, I quote these lines from Aristotle's Ethics:
Friendship would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would
seem to be more concerned about it than about justice. For concord
would seem to be similar to friendship and legislators aim at concord
above all, while they try above all to expel civil conflict, which is
enmity. Further, if people are friends, they have no need of justice,
but if they are just they need friendship in addition; and the justice
that is most just seems to belong to friendship.45
These readings of For the Sake of Argument raise questions about
how to treat each other justly and with friendly spirit when we disagree
over the things we hold most important. Nothing could be a more
important subject for future inquiry.
45. ARISTOTLE, supra note 16.
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